Behind the Curtain: How the IRGC Controls Iranian Media and Messaging

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the story told to the public is carefully crafted—not by journalists, but by a military-industrial-intelligence apparatus that views truth as a threat. At the heart of this system is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has quietly built one of the most formidable propaganda machines in the Middle East.

From controlling state TV to infiltrating private media, and from silencing journalists to manipulating narratives abroad, the IRGC’s grip on information ensures the regime’s survival. This update explores how the IRGC shapes public perception, erases dissent, and turns communication into a weapon of control.

1. Media as a Security Asset

In democratic societies, the media serves as a watchdog. In Iran, it is a guard dog—serving the ideological and security needs of the regime.

The IRGC regards media not as a public service, but as a national security tool. Its Information Protection Organization and Intelligence Organization (SAS and Sazman-e Ettela’at-e Sepah) work closely with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) to enforce messaging discipline.

Key institutions include:

 • IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) – Fully controlled by the Supreme Leader’s office, staffed by regime loyalists, and indirectly monitored by the IRGC

 • Fars News Agency – Widely regarded as the IRGC’s official media mouthpiece

 • Tasnim News Agency – Affiliated with the Quds Force, used to push anti-Western and anti-Israeli content

2. Recruitment and Infiltration of Journalists

The IRGC actively recruits journalists and embeds intelligence officers in newsrooms. Leaked documents show that many so-called “reporters” for state media are in fact operatives trained by IRGC-run institutions such as the Imam Sadegh University.

Some journalists are coerced into collaboration through blackmail, threats to family members, or exposure of private data. Others join voluntarily, drawn by ideological conviction or promises of security clearance and perks.

Key tactics:

 • Censorship via newsroom “monitors”

 • Bribery and ideological vetting

 • Pressure to cover regime “success stories” while downplaying unrest

3. Censorship, Intimidation, and Prison

Independent journalism is virtually impossible under IRGC control. Scores of Iranian journalists have been jailed, tortured, or exiled for reporting on sensitive issues—from protests to corruption.

Prominent examples:

 • Ruhollah Zam, founder of Amad News, executed in 2020 after being kidnapped by the IRGC in Iraq

 • Niloofar Hamedi & Elaheh Mohammadi, imprisoned in 2022 for reporting on Mahsa Amini’s death

 • Evin Prison’s “media wing”—where journalists are routinely tortured

The IRGC’s Intelligence Unit is responsible for monitoring online activity and arresting those who post “propaganda against the regime.” Charges are vague but punishments severe.

4. The Propaganda Machine: From TV to Telegram

TV & Radio

 • IRIB runs dozens of national and provincial TV channels, all tightly scripted

 • Programming includes religious sermons, anti-Western documentaries, military glorification, and “confession shows” featuring tortured detainees

News Websites

 • Fars, Tasnim, RajaNews, Mashregh, and Mehr: all promote IRGC-aligned narratives

 • Stories often mimic Russian-style disinformation: mixing real events with distortion and conspiracy

Social Media Operations

Despite bans on platforms like Twitter and Facebook inside Iran, the IRGC runs thousands of fake accounts, spreading pro-regime content and attacking dissidents. These “cyber armies” also:

 • Report protest videos for takedown

 • Spread rumors about activists

 • Launch hashtag wars during protests or elections

5. Shaping the Narrative Abroad

Iranian state media in exile is a growing concern.

IRGC-linked journalists and sympathizers have penetrated diaspora outlets, and some western-based “alternative media” repeat regime talking points under the guise of anti-imperialism.

Meanwhile, Press TV and HispanTV (state-funded channels in English and Spanish) target foreign audiences with slick anti-Western messaging and conspiracy-laden segments about Zionism, sanctions, and U.S. policy.

Recent IRGC operations also involved:

 • Coordinated trolling campaigns during the 2020 U.S. election

 • Cyberattacks on Persian-language independent media like Iran International

 • Disinformation targeting exiled activists like Masih Alinejad

6. Manufactured Confessions and Public Shaming

One of the IRGC’s most sinister practices is forcing detainees to “confess” on live TV. These staged confessions are broadcast via IRIB and republished on Fars and Tasnim, usually before any trial has occurred.

These videos serve multiple purposes:

 • Discrediting dissidents as “foreign agents”

 • Frightening potential protesters

 • Reinforcing the IRGC’s “omnipotence”

Human rights groups like Amnesty International have documented numerous cases of these forced confessions involving torture, rape threats, and solitary confinement.

7. Targeting Families and Smearing Exiles

The IRGC also uses media to wage psychological warfare on families of victims and exiles.

Examples include:

 • Airing accusations that murdered protesters were drug addicts or foreign-backed terrorists

 • Publishing doctored photos of activists with fake captions

 • Broadcasting interviews with families coerced to denounce their children

Even abroad, the regime uses Telegram channels to leak private data of activists, framing them as “traitors” or “CIA agents.”

8. Disinformation During Crises

During mass protests, plane crashes, or assassinations, the IRGC’s media machine floods the zone with confusion.

Tactics include:

 • Denial and delay (e.g., 3 days to admit IRGC shot down Flight PS752)

 • Blame-shifting (e.g., claiming protests are “Zionist” plots)

 • Misleading “fact-checks” that echo disinformation

These efforts are designed to distort reality, slow down international reaction, and create plausible deniability.

9. Youth Indoctrination: Media for the Next Generation

The IRGC uses media to shape not just perception but identity—especially among Iran’s youth.

Programs like:

 • Ofogh TV – targeting conservative families

 • Basij-run children’s media – cartoons glorifying martyrdom

 • “Soft War” units in universities – training students to combat Western culture

This content promotes religious nationalism, anti-Western conspiracy, and obedience to the Supreme Leader—while attacking feminism, LGBTQ rights, and secularism.

10. Resistance: The Fight for Truth

Despite the crackdown, Iranians continue to fight for access to truth:

 • Citizen journalists share protest videos via VPNs and secure messengers

 • Diaspora outlets like IranWire, Radio Farda, and BBC Persian work around censorship

 • Digital activists build anti-censorship tools, VPN networks, and satellite-based news feeds

International support—including digital security tools, platform accountability, and asylum for exiled journalists—is critical.

Conclusion: Information as a Battlefield

The IRGC knows that controlling the narrative is half the war. That’s why it invests so heavily in media, surveillance, and propaganda. But its grip is not total—and every flash of truth, every leaked video, every resistance tweet erodes that control.